The news reports of the past few days have brought us enough fuel to keep us outraged for the next decade. Let’s just hope that some of this lasts long enough for the November elections. I will touch on just three of the latest stories that should get the pitchfork-wielding mobs off their asses and into the streets. Nevertheless, we have to be realistic about these things. With the Super Bowl coming up, it’s going to be tough to pry those butts off the couches.
The first effrontery should not come as too much of a surprise. The Times of London has reported that Goldman Sachs CEO, Lloyd Blankfein (a/k/a Lloyd Bankfiend) is expecting to receive a $100 million bonus this year:
Bankers in Davos for the World Economic Forum (WEF) told The Times yesterday they understood that Lloyd Blankfein and other top Goldman bankers outside Britain were set to receive some of the bank’s biggest-ever payouts. “This is Lloyd thumbing his nose at Obama,” said a banker at one of Goldman’s rivals.
Blankfein is also thumbing his nose at the American taxpayers. Despite widespread media insistence that Goldman Sachs “paid back the government” there is a bit of unfinished business arising from something called Maiden Lane III — for which Goldman should owe us billions.
That matter brings us to our second item: the recently-released Quarterly Report from SIGTARP (the Special Investigator General for TARP — Neil Barofsky). The report is 224 pages long, so I’ll refer you to the handy summary prepared by Michael Shedlock (“Mish”). Mish’s headline drove home the point that there are currently 77 ongoing investigations of fraud, money laundering and insider trading as a result of the TARP bank bailout program. Here are a few more of his points, used as introductions to numerous quoted passages from the SIGTARP report:
The Report Blasts Geithner and the NY Fed. I seriously doubt Geithner survives this but the sad thing is Geithner will not end up in prison where he belongs.
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Please consider a prime conflict of interest example in regards to PPIP, the Public-Private-Investment-Plan, specifically designed to allow banks to dump their worst assets onto the public (taxpayers) shielding banks from the risk.
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Note the refutation of the preposterous claims that taxpayers will be made whole.
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TARP Tutorial: How Taxpayers Lose Money When Banks Fail
My favorite comment from Mish appears near the conclusion of his summary:
Clearly TARP was a complete failure, that is assuming the goals of TARP were as stated.
My belief is the benefits of TARP and the entire alphabet soup of lending facilities was not as stated by Bernanke and Geithner, but rather to shift as much responsibility as quickly as possible on to the backs of taxpayers while trumping up nonsensical benefits of doing so. This was done to bail out the banks at any and all cost to the taxpayers.
Was this a huge conspiracy by the Fed and Treasury to benefit the banks at taxpayer expense? Of course it was, and the conspiracy is unraveling as documented in this report and as documented in AIG Coverup Conspiracy Unravels.
Mish’s last remark (and his link to an earlier posting) brings us to the third disgrace to be covered in this piece: The AIG bailout cover-up. On January 29, David Reilly wrote an article for Bloomberg News (and Business Week) concerning last Wednesday’s hearing before the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform. After quoting from Reilly’s article, Mish made this observation:
Most know I am not a big believer in conspiracies. I regularly dismiss them. However, this one was clear from the beginning and like all massive conspiracies, it is now in the light of day.
The idea of secret banking cabals that control the country and global economy are a given among conspiracy theorists who stockpile ammo, bottled water and peanut butter. After this week’s congressional hearing into the bailout of American International Group Inc., you have to wonder if those folks are crazy after all.
Wednesday’s hearing described a secretive group deploying billions of dollars to favored banks, operating with little oversight by the public or elected officials.
That “secretive group” is The Federal Reserve of New York, whose president at the time of the AIG bailout was “Turbo” Tim Geithner. David Reilly’s disgust at the hearing’s revelations became apparent from the tone of his article:
By pursuing this line of inquiry, the hearing revealed some of the inner workings of the New York Fed and the outsized role it plays in banking. This insight is especially valuable given that the New York Fed is a quasi-governmental institution that isn’t subject to citizen intrusions such as freedom of information requests, unlike the Federal Reserve.
This impenetrability comes in handy since the bank is the preferred vehicle for many of the Fed’s bailout programs. It’s as though the New York Fed was a black-ops outfit for the nation’s central bank.
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The New York Fed is one of 12 Federal Reserve Banks that operate under the supervision of the Federal Reserve’s board of governors, chaired by Ben Bernanke. Member-bank presidents are appointed by nine-member boards, who themselves are appointed largely by other bankers.
As Representative Marcy Kaptur told Geithner at the hearing: “A lot of people think that the president of the New York Fed works for the U.S. government. But in fact you work for the private banks that elected you.”
The “cover-up” aspect to this caper involved intervention by the New York Fed that included editing AIG’s communications to investors and pressuring the Securities and Exchange Commission to keep secret the details of the bailouts of AIG’s counterparties (Maiden Lane III). The Fed’s opposition to disclosure of such documentation to Congress was the subject of a New York Timesopinion piece in December. The recent SIGTARP report emphasized the disingenuous nature of the Fed’s explanation for keeping this information hidden:
SIGTARP’s audit also noted that the now familiar argument from Government officials about the dire consequences of basic transparency, as advocated by the Federal Reserve in connection with Maiden Lane III, once again simply does not withstand scrutiny. Federal Reserve officials initially refused to disclose the identities of the counterparties or the details of the payments, warning that disclosure of the names would undermine AIG’s stability, the privacy and business interests of the counterparties, and the stability of the markets. After public and Congressional pressure, AIG disclosed the identities of its counterparties, including its eight largest: Societe Generale, Goldman Sachs Group Inc., Merrill Lynch, Deutsche Bank AG, UBS, Calyon Corporate and Investment Banking (a subsidiary of Credit Agricole S.A.), Barclays PLC, and Bank of America.
Notwithstanding the Federal Reserve’s warnings, the sky did not fall; there is no indication that AIG’s disclosure undermined the stability of AIG or the market or damaged legitimate interests of the counterparties.
The SIGTARP investigation has revealed some activity that most people would never have imagined possible given the enormous amounts of money involved in these bailouts and the degree of oversight (that should have been) in place. The bigger question becomes: Will any criminal charges be brought against those officials who breached the public trust by facilitating this monumental theft of taxpayer dollars?
Comments Off on The Dishonesty Behind The Bernanke Vote
January 28. 2010
While reading a recent Huffington Post piece by Jason Linkins, wherein he criticized President Obama’s proposed spending freeze, I was struck by Linkins’ emphasis on the notion that this proposal signaled a return to “institutionalized infantilism”:
One of the most significant things that Obama promised to do during the campaign was to simply level with the American people — deal with them in straightforward fashion, tell the hard truths, make the tough choices, and go about explaining his decisions as if he were talking to adults.
Linkins referred to a recent essay about the freeze, written by Ryan Avent of The Economist, which underscored the greater, underlying problem motivating politicians such as Obama to believe they can “slip one by” the gullible public:
This is yet another move toward the infantilisation of the electorate; whatever the gamesmanship behind the proposal, Mr. Obama has apparently concluded that the electorate can’t be expected to handle anything like a real description of the tough decisions which must be made.
Matt Taibbi made a similar observation about our President, while pondering whether the announced reliance on the wisdom of Paul Volcker meant an end to Tim Geithner’s days as Treasury Secretary:
Obama, as is his nature I think, tried to take the fork in the road all year, making nice to his base while actually delivering to his money people, not realizing the two were perpetually in conflict. His failure to make a clear choice, or rather to make the right choice, is what has doomed him everywhere politically.
It will be interesting to see what comes next, whether this is just for show or not.
We are now witnessing another example of this “infantilisation of the electorate” as it takes place with the dishonest maneuvering to get Ben Bernanke’s nomination to a second term past a filibuster. Here’s how this scam was exposed by Josh Rosner at The Big Picture website:
Sources have suggested that Senator Barbara Boxer (D-CA) intends to vote “yes” on Chairman Bernanke’s cloture vote and “no” on the floor. The cloture vote requires 60 “yes” votes to approve and really is THE vote to confirm. The floor vote only requires a simple majority to pass and therefore is a less important vote requiring fewer “yes” votes.
Get it? These Senators believe they can go back to their constituents with a straight face and tell the chumps that they voted against Bernanke’s confirmation when, in fact, they facilitated his confirmation by voting for cloture to give Bernanke a boost over the potentially insurmountable, 60-vote hurdle. This sleight-of-hand comes along at the precise moment when we are learning about Bernanke’s true role in the AIG bailout. As Ryan Grim reported for The Huffington Post:
A Republican senator said Tuesday that documents showing Federal Reserve Board Chairman Ben Bernake covered up the fact that his staff recommended he not bailout AIG are being kept from the public. And a House Republican charged that a whistleblower had alerted Congress to specific documents provide “troubling details” of Bernanke’s role in the AIG bailout.
Sen. Jim Bunning (R-Ky.), a Bernanke critic, said on CNBC that he has seen documents showing that Bernanke overruled such a recommendation. If that’s the case, it raises questions about whether bailing out AIG was actually necessary, and what Bernanke’s motives were.
Yves Smith of Naked Capitalism disclosed that Congressman Darrell Issa, who has been investigating the AIG bailout in his role as ranking Republican on the House Oversight and Government Reform Committee, “believes there is evidence that says Bernanke overruled his staff and authorized the rescue”. Ms. Smith explained how Issa is pushing ahead to investigate:
Rep. Darrell Issa of the House Oversight Committee has asked to Committee Chairman Towns to subpoena more documents from the Fed regarding its decision-making process in the AIG bailout.
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In addition, Issa has noted that the Fed had failed to comply in full with previous subpoenas, and has not released any documents relative to AIG prior to September 2008 or after May 2009, even though they fall within the scope of previous subpoenas.
Congressman Issa’s letter can be viewed in its entirety here.
You may recall that the fight against the Fed for release of the AIG bailout documents became the subject of an opinion piece in the December 19 edition of The New York Times, written by Eliot Spitzer, Frank Partnoy and William Black.
There are plenty of reasons to oppose confirmation of Ben Bernanke to a second term as Fed chair. Senator Jim Bunning did a fantastic job articulating many of those points during the confirmation hearing on December 3. Beyond that, economist Randall Wray gave us “3 Reasons to Fear Bernanke’s Reappointment” at the Roosevelt Institute’s New Deal 2.0 website. Dr. Wray concluded his essay with this statement:
To be clear, I would prefer to replace Bernanke with someone who actually understands monetary policy and who advocates regulation and supervision of financial institutions.
The really pressing issue at this point is whether the withheld AIG bailout documents, which are the subject of Congressman Issa’s latest inquiry, might actually reveal some malefaction on the part of Bernanke himself. A revelation of that magnitude would certainly kill the confirmation effort. If Bernanke is confirmed prior to the release of documents indicating malfeasance on his part, I’ll be wishing I had a dollar for every time a Senator would say: “I just voted for cloture –but I voted against confirmation.”
By now you should be aware of the fact that for his 56th birthday, Federal Reserve chairman Ben Bernanke was named Time magazine’s “Person of the Year”. Were the folks at Time so arrogant as to believe that this honor would insure the confirmation of Bernanke to a second term as chairman of the Federal Reserve? More than a few commentators expressed the view that Time’s “Person of the Year” award might actually jeopardize Bernanke’s chance at confirmation. For example, take a look at what Mike Shedlock (a/k/a Mish) had to say:
That Bernanke is on the cover of Time Magazine means one thing “Bernanke’s Time Is Limited” He is on his way out. And that is good news.
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The quicker this blows up, the quicker we can recover. And knowing what we know about Time Magazine, Central Banking will blow up sooner rather than later. Moreover, Bernanke will not be part of the solution, and that is a good thing.
I thank Time Magazine for the information and their kiss of death warning. However, I must also remind readers that Stalin made the cover twice, so immediate results just might be expecting too much.
When Bernanke was grilled by the Senate Banking Committee during the confirmation hearing on December 3, Senator Jim Bunning of Kentucky gave him a magnificent pummeling, most notable for the assertion: “You are the definition of a moral hazard!” My only criticism of Bunning’s diatribe was that he should have said: “You are the personification of a moral hazard” or “You are the epitome of a moral hazard” — otherwise, it was perfect. If that weren’t enough, Senator Bunning demanded that Bernanke answer seventy written questions submitted by Bunning himself. Those of you who have ever been a party to a lawsuit might recall having to provide signed answers to written interrogatories. Most jurisdictions place a limit on the number of such interrogatories to the extent of approximately 35. Senator Bunning propounded twice that many to Bernanke and the nominee answered all of them. Don Luskin of Smart Moneyanalyzed one of these answers in a way that underscored the necessity of removing Bernanke from the Fed chairmanship.
On December 18, Victoria McGrane reported for Politico that the Bernanke nomination “could be in more trouble than previously thought”. Although the Senate Banking Committee voted to confirm the nomination, ultimately the entire Seante must vote on the matter. The fact that six Republicans and one Democrat from the Banking Committee voted against the nomination was portrayed as an ominous signal, casting doubt on the likelihood of confirmation. Ms. McGrane discussed the reaction to the confirmation hearings expressed by Brian Gardner, a bank analyst for Keefe, Bruyette and Woods:
Two aspects of the two-hour debate that preceded the committee vote struck Gardner as worrisome for Bernanke: the unenthusiastic — even apologetic — tone from some of the senators who voted yes and a dispute over the Fed’s refusal to release documents about the bailout of insurance giant American International Group to senators on the committee.
The article explained that the AIG bailout documents were available for review by “some banking committee staffers” although the documents have been withheld by the Fed from individual senators and the public, based on the Fed’s claim that the documents are “protected”.
This is apparently an assertion by the Fed that there is some sort of privilege protecting the AIG bailout documents from disclosure. Nevertheless, if the fight over these records ever gets before a court, it is likely that production of the documents would be compelled, since any claim of privilege was waived once the Fed allowed the “banking committee staffers” to review the items.
The Politico report noted the significance of this matter:
That spat could have legs, Gardner said, and if it resonates with a public already fuming at the Fed, it could sway the votes of yes-leaning senators.
The battle over the AIG bailout documents was also the subject of an opinion piece in the December 19 edition of The New York Times, written by Eliot Spitzer, Frank Partnoy and William Black. Here’s some of what they had to say:
No doubt, some of the e-mail messages contain privileged conversations among lawyers. Others probably include private information that is irrelevant to A.I.G.’s role in the crisis. But the vast majority of these documents could be made public without legal concern. So why haven’t the Treasury and the Federal Reserve already made sure the public could see this information? Do they want to protect A.I.G., or do they worry about shining too much sunlight on their own performance leading up to and during the crisis?
What will these e-mails reveal about the actions of Ben Bernanke and “Turbo” Tim Geithner during the AIG bailout phase of the financial crisis? Were laws violated or do they simply exhibit some poor decision-making and cronyism?
Most of us are now getting ready for the coldest month of the year – but for Ben Bernanke, the heat is being turned up — full blast.
But ask what your country can do for its largest banks.
— “Turbo” Tim
All right . . . “Turbo” Tim Geithner didn’t really say that (yet) but we’ve all seen how his actions affirm that doctrine. Former federal banking regulator, Professor William Black, recently criticized Geithner for not protecting the taxpayers when Turbo Tim bailed out CIT Group to the tune of 2.4 billion dollars this past summer. CIT has now filed for bankruptcy. Henry Blodget of The Business Insider described Professor Black’s outrage over this situation:
The government was in no way obligated to lend the struggling CIT money and, in fact, initially refused to provide it bailout funds. More importantly, being the lender of last resort, the government should have guaranteed we’d be the first to get paid if CIT eventually filed Chapter 11. By failing to do so, “it’s like he [Geithner] burned billions of dollars again in government money, our money, gratuitously,” says Black.
After Tuesday’s election defeats for the Democrats in two gubernatorial races, the subject of “bailout fatigue” has been getting more attention.
Acting under the pretext of “transparency” the Obama administration has developed a strategy of holding meetings for people and groups with whom the administration knows it is losing credibility. Jane Hamsher of FiredogLake.com has written about the Obama team’s efforts to keep the disaffected Left under control by corralling these groups into what Hamsher calls “the veal pen”. She described one meeting wherein Rahm Emanuel used the expression “f**king stupid” in reference to the critics of those Democrats opposing the public option in proposed healthcare reform legislation.
A different format was followed at what appeared to be a “message control” conference, held on Monday at the Treasury Department. This time, the guest list was comprised of a politically diverse group of financial bloggers. One attendee, Yves Smith of Naked Capitalism, described the meeting as “curious”:
None of us knew in advance how many attendees there would be; there were eight of us at a two-hour session, Interfluidity, Marginal Revolution, Kid Dynamite’s World, Across the Curve, Financial Armageddon, Accrued Interest, and Aleph (and of course, others may have been invited who had scheduling conflicts).
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It wasn’t obvious what the objective of the meeting was (aside the obvious idea that if they were nice to us we might reciprocate. Unfortunately, some of us are not housebroken). I will give them credit for having the session be almost entirely a Q&A, not much in the way of presentation. One official made some remarks about the state of financial institutions; later another said a few things about regulatory reform. The funniest moment was when, right after the spiel on regulatory reform, Steve Waldman said, “I’ve read your bill and I think it’s terrible.” They did offer to go over it with him. It will be interesting to see if that happens.
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My bottom line is that the people we met are very cognitively captured, assuming one can take their remarks at face value. Although they kept stressing all the things that had changed or they were planning to change, the polite pushback from pretty all the attendees was that what Treasury thought of as major progress was insufficient.
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Several of us raised questions about whether what their vision for the industry’s structure was and that the objective seemed to be to restore the financial system that got us in trouble in the first place.
. . . it wasn’t clear that there was a “plan B” in place if things do not recover in 2010 as many mainstream analysts expect. In fact, the suggestion from one official was that the tenure of the current crisis would likely be nearer the shorter end of expectations.
There was also a bit of a disconnect between the remarks various Treasury officials have made in public forums and what was said at the meeting. … Yesterday, however, a number of those present clearly acknowledged that things could (still) go wrong and said such fears kept them awake at night. While that is not unusual in and of itself, at the very least it adds to doubts I and others have expressed about the true state of the financial system and the economy.
Finally, the meeting seemed to confirm the strong grip that Wall Street has on the levers of legislative power.
The most informative rendition of the events at the conclave came from Kid Dynamite, whose two-part narrative began with a look at how Michael Panzner interrupted a Treasury official who was describing the Treasury’s current focus “on reducing the footprint of economic intervention cautiously, quickly and prudently”:
Michael Panzner jumped right in, addressing a concept I’ve written about previously – that of “extend and pretend,” or “delay and pray” – the concept of attempting to avoid recognizing actual losses and or insolvencies, and growing out of them after enough time. Panzner called it “fake it ‘till you make it.” I mentioned that I felt like we were undergoing a “Ponzi scheme of confidence” – but that confidence mattered less than ever in the current environment where, contrary to perhaps the prior 10 years, confidence can no longer be “spent.”
Kid Dynamite’s report contained too many great passages for me to quote here without running on excessively. Just be sure to read his entire report, including Part II (which should be posted by the time you read this).
David Merkel of The Aleph Blog also submitted a two-part report (so far — with more to come) although Part 2 is more informative. Here are some highlights:
As all bloggers there will note, those from the Treasury were kind, intelligent, funny … they were real people, unlike the common tendency to demonize those in DC.
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To the Treasury I would say, “Markets are inherently unstable, and that is a good thing.” They often have to adjust to severe changes in the human condition, and governmental attempts to tame markets may result in calm for a time, and a tsunami thereafter.
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As for the bank stress-testing, one can look at it two ways: 1) the way I looked at it at the time — short on details, many generalities, not trusting the results. (Remember, I have done many such analyses myself for insurers.) or, 2) something that gave confidence to the markets when they were in an oversold state. Duh, but I was dumb — the oversold market rallied when it learned that the Treasury had its back.
John Jansen from Across The Curve included his report on the meeting within his usual morning posting concerning the bond market on November 4. In a subsequent posting that afternoon, he referred his readers to the Kid Dynamite report. Here’s what Mr. Jansen did say about the event:
. . . those officials expressed real concern about the downside risks to the economy (as did blogger Michael Panzner of Financial Armageddon) and since I think that the relationship between the Treasury and the Federal Reserve has morphed into something somewhat incestuous I suspect that the Federal Reserve will not jump off the reservation and take the first baby steps to exiting its easy money policy.
The report at the Accrued Interest blog drew some hostile comments from readers who seemed convinced that Accrued was the only blogger there who actually drank the Kool-Aid being served by the Treasury. Their reaction was easily understandable after reading this remark (which followed a breach of protocol with the admission that Turbo Tim was there in the flesh):
It was a fascinating experience and I have to admit, it was just plain cool to be within the bowels of power like that.
Huh? All I can say is: If you like being in powerful bowels, just take a cruise over to duPont Circle. Actually — it was at his next statement where he lost me:
I am also on record as saying that Geithner was a good choice for Treasury secretary.
— and then it was all downhill from there.
The administration’s “charm offensive” has moved to the dicey issue of financial reform, where it is drawing criticism from across the political spectrum. Given the fact that they have all but admitted to a strategy of simply reading The Secret and willing everything to get better by their positive thoughts — Michael Panzner might as well start writing Financial Armageddon — The Sequel.
Those whales are back in the news again — this time due to calls for their slaughter. In case you’re wondering what kind of person would advocate the killing of whales, I would like to identify two people who recently spoke out in favor of such action. The first of these individuals is one of my favorite columnists at The New York Times, Gretchen Morgenson, winner of the Pulitzer Prize in 2002 for her “trenchant and incisive” coverage of Wall Street. The second is the chair of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Sheila Bair. Two women want to have whales killed? Yes. However, the “whales” in question are those infamous financial institutions considered “too big to fail”. On October 3, Gretchen Morgenson wrote a piece for The New York Times, entitled: “The Cost of Saving These Whales” in which she defined “to big to fail” institutions as “banks that are so big and interconnected that their very existence threatens the world”. She discussed the problems caused by the continued existence of those whales with this explanation:
During the credit bust, our leaders embraced the too-big-to-fail policy, reluctantly bailing out large institutions to save the system from collapse, they said. Yet even as the crisis has abated, these policy makers have shown little interest in cutting financial monsters down to size. This is especially disturbing given that some institutions have grown even larger as a result of the mess.
It is perverse, of course, to reward big banks’ mistakes with bailouts financed by beleaguered taxpayers. But the too-big-to-fail doctrine benefits the banks in other ways as well: the implication that an institution will not be allowed to fall gives it significant cost advantages over smaller, perhaps more responsible competitors.
On October 4, Sheila Bair of the FDIC gave a speech before the International Institute of Finance at their annual meeting in Istanbul, Turkey. At the outset, she pointed out that “the first task” in creating “a more resilient, transparent, and better-regulated financial system” would be to scrap the “too big to fail” doctrine. She went on to explain how to go about killing those whales:
To do this we need a resolution regime that provides for the orderly wind-down of banking and other financial enterprises without imposing costs on the taxpayers.
The solution must involve a practical and effective mechanism for the orderly resolution of these institutions similar to that used for FDIC-insured banks.
This new regime would not permit taxpayer funds to be used to prop up a firm or its management. Instead, senior management would be replaced, and losses would be borne by the stockholders and creditors.
On September 23, 2009 Treasury Secretary “Turbo” Tim Geithner testified before the House Financial Services Committee to explain his planned financial reform agenda. Here’s what Turbo Tim had to say about the plan for dealing with the “too big to fail” problem:
First, we cannot allow firms to reap the benefits of explicit or implicit government subsidies without very strong government oversight. We must substantially reduce the moral hazard created by the perception that these subsidies exist; address their corrosive effects on market discipline; and minimize their encouragement of risk-taking.
So, in other words … the government subsidies to these institutions will continue, but only if the recipients get “very strong government oversight”. In his next sentence Geithner expressed his belief that the moral hazard was created “by the perception that these subsidies exist” rather than the FACT that they exist. Geithner’s scheme of continued corporate welfare for the biggest financial institutions is consistent with what we learned about him from Jo Becker and Gretchen Morgenson in their New York Times article back on April 26. That essay gave us some great insight about Turbo Tim’s blindness to moral hazard:
Last June, with a financial hurricane gathering force, Treasury Secretary Henry M. Paulson Jr. convened the nation’s economic stewards for a brainstorming session. What emergency powers might the government want at its disposal to confront the crisis? he asked.
Timothy F. Geithner, who as president of the New York Federal Reserve Bank oversaw many of the nation’s most powerful financial institutions, stunned the group with the audacity of his answer. He proposed asking Congress to give the president broad power to guarantee all the debt in the banking system, according to two participants, including Michele Davis, then an assistant Treasury secretary.
The proposal quickly died amid protests that it was politically untenable because it could put taxpayers on the hook for trillions of dollars.
“People thought, ‘Wow, that’s kind of out there,’” said John C. Dugan, the comptroller of the currency, who heard about the idea afterward. Mr. Geithner says, “I don’t remember a serious discussion on that proposal then.”
But in the 10 months since then, the government has in many ways embraced his blue-sky prescription. Step by step, through an array of new programs, the Federal Reserve and Treasury have assumed an unprecedented role in the banking system, using unprecedented amounts of taxpayer money, to try to save the nation’s financiers from their own mistakes.
And more often than not, Mr. Geithner has been a leading architect of those bailouts, the activist at the head of the pack. He was the federal regulator most willing to “push the envelope,” said H. Rodgin Cohen, a prominent Wall Street lawyer who spoke frequently with Mr. Geithner.
Geithner’s objective of putting the prosperity of the banks ahead of any concern for the taxpayers was again demonstrated in this AFP report from October 6:
On proposed changes to the financial system, Geithner said it was “legitimate” for banks to be influential and admitted that reform could “pose risks to financial innovation.”
Nevertheless, he stressed that “the most important issue is that if stability (of financial institutions) is not guaranteed, it will become harder to raise capital.”
On October 6, Newsweek published an interview conducted by Nancy Cook with William Black, a former federal regulator during the Savings & Loan crisis and a professor of economics and law at the University of Missouri – Kansas City. The interview included a discussion of the government’s response to the financial crisis. One remark made by Mr. Black reinforced my opinion about Turbo Tim:
“Some of the things Bernanke did were very bad, but he is in sharp contrast to Geithner who has been wrong about everything in his career. When Geithner was once answering a question in response to Ron Paul, he said, ‘I’ve never been a regulator.’ He was then the President of the New York Federal Reserve, and he purports that he was never a regulator? That is a demonstration of what is wrong with the Federal Reserve banks if the head of the unit doesn’t think he’s a regulator. He’s a disaster.”
It should come as no surprise that Richard Carnell, a Professor at Fordham Law School and former Assistant Treasury Secretary for President Clinton, would have this to say about Geithner’s financial reform agenda, when asked for his comments by Kim Thai of Fortune:
The plan includes useful reforms. But it’s also naive, timid, misguided, politically inept, and intellectually dishonest.
It places naive faith in regulation. Yet regulation failed disastrously over the past decade. Bank regulators had ample powers to keep banks safe but did too little, too late. They let banks use $12-13 in borrowed money for every $1 in shareholders’ money. The administration’s response? Give regulators more powers.
[The plan] preserves a preposterous tangle of overlapping regulators. And it didn’t arrive until June, seven months after the election. By then the crisis had faded and special interest politics had come roaring back.
It entrenches bailouts for large financial institutions. Voters know that’s rotten policy. It makes firms like General Electric divest their banks. That serves no purpose. It’s like trying to ward off the Mexican Mafia by fortifying the Canadian border. Small wonder voters remain skeptical.
It appears as though Turbo Tim is not up to the job of killing those whales. Perhaps the President should find someone who is.
Last year’s financial crisis and our current economic crisis have exposed some pretty ugly things to an unsuspecting public. As news reporters dig and as witnesses are called to testify, these investigations are turning over a very large rock, revealing all the colonies of maggots and fungus infestations, just below ground level, out of our usual view. The voters are learning more about the sleaziness that takes place on Wall Street and in the halls of Congress. Hopefully, they will become motivated to demand some changes.
A recent report by American Public Media’s Steve Henn revealed how the law prohibiting “insider trading” (i.e. acting on confidential corporate information when making a transaction involving that company’s publicly-traded stock) does not apply to members of Congress. Remember how Martha Stewart went to prison? Well, if she had been representing Connecticut in Congress, she might have been able to interpose the defense that she was inspired to sell her ImClone stock based on information she acquired in the exercise of her official duties. Mr. Henn’s report discussed the investment transactions made by some Senators after having been informed by former Treasury Secretary Hank Paulson and Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke, that our financial system was on the verge of a meltdown. After quoting GOP House Minority Leader John Boehner’s public acknowledgement last September that:
We clearly have an unprecedented crisis in our financial system. . . .
On behalf of the American people our job is to put our partisan differences aside and to work together to help solve this crisis.
Mr. Henn proceeded to explain how swift Senatorial action resulted in a bipartisan exercise of greed:
The next day, according to personal financial disclosures, Boehner cashed out of a fund designed to profit from inflation. Since he sold, it’s lost more than half its value.
Sen. Dick Durbin, an Illinois Democrat, who was also at that meeting sold more than $40,000 in mutual funds and reinvested it all with Warren Buffett.
Durbin said like millions of others he was worried about his retirement. Boehner says his stock broker acted alone without even talking to him. Both lawmakers say they didn’t benefit from any special tips.
But over time members of Congress do much better than the rest of us when playing the stock market.
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The value of information that flows from the inner workings of Washington isn’t lost on Wall Street professionals.
Michael Bagley is a former congressional staffer who now runs the OSINT Group. Bagley sells access and research. His clients are hedge funds, and he makes it his business to mine Congress and the rest of Washington for tips.
MICHAEL Bagley: The power center of finance has moved from Wall Street to Washington.
His firm is just one recent entry into Washington’s newest growth industry.
CRAIG HOLMAN: It’s called political intelligence.
Craig Holman is at Public Citizen, a consumer watchdog. Holman believes lobbyists shouldn’t be allowed to sell tips to hedge funds and members of Congress shouldn’t trade on non-public information. But right now it’s legal.
HOLMAN: It’s absolutely incredible, but the Securities and Exchange Act does not apply to members of Congress, congressional staff or even lobbyists.
That law bans corporate insiders, from executives to their bankers and lawyers, from trading on inside information. But it doesn’t apply to political intelligence. That makes this business lucrative. Bagley says firms can charge hedge funds $25,000 a month just to follow a hot issue.
BAGLEY: So information is a commodity in Washington.
Inside information on dozens of issues, from bank capitol requirements to new student loan rules, can move markets. Consumer advocate Craig Holman is backing a bill called the STOCK Act. Introduced in the House, it would force political-intelligence firms to disclose their clients and it would ban lawmakers, staffers, and lobbyists from profiting on non-public knowledge.
Mr. Henn’s report went on to raise concern over the fact that there is nothing to stop members of Congress from acting on such information to the detriment of their constituents in favor of their own portfolios.
I understand, and share, concern that the financial crisis has revealed weaknesses in our regulatory and supervisory agencies as well as in the activities of private financial institutions. There has been criticism of the Federal Reserve itself, and even proposals to remove responsibilities other than monetary policy, strictly defined, from the Fed.
Mr. Volcker discussed a number of suggestions for regulatory changes to prevent a repeat of last year’s crisis. He criticized Treasury Secretary “Turbo” Tim Geithner’s approach toward what amounts to simply baby-sitting for those financial institutions considered “too big to fail”. Here is some of Mr. Volcker’s discussion on that point:
However well justified in terms of dealing with the extreme threats to the financial system in the midst of crisis, the emergency actions of the Federal Reserve, the Treasury, and ultimately the Congress to protect the viability of particular institutions – their bond holders and to some extent even their stockholders – have inevitably left an indelible mark on attitudes and behavior patterns of market participants.
Will not the pattern of protection for the largest banks and their holding companies tend to encourage greater risk-taking, including active participation in volatile capital markets, especially when compensation practices so greatly reward short-term success?
Are community or regional banks to be deemed “too small to save”, raising questions of competitive viability?
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What all this amounts to is an unintended and unanticipated extension of the official “safety net”, an arrangement designed decades ago to protect the stability of the commercial banking system. The obvious danger is that with the passage of time, risk-taking will be encouraged and efforts at prudential restraint will be resisted. Ultimately, the possibility of further crises – even greater crises – will increase.
This concern is often discussed as the “moral hazard” issue. William Black, Associate Professor of Economics and Law at the University of Missouri – Kansas City published an excellent paper concerning this issue on September 10. He made some great suggestions as to how to deal with these “Systemically Dangerous Institutions”:
Historically, “too big to fail” was a misnomer – large, insolvent banks and S&Ls were placed in receivership and their “risk capital” (shareholders and subordinated debtholders) received nothing. That treatment is fair, minimizes the costs to the taxpayers, and minimizes “moral hazard.” “Too big to fail” meant only that they were not placed in liquidating receiverships (akin to a Chapter 7 “liquidating” bankruptcy). In this crisis, however, regulators have twisted the term into immunity. Massive insolvent banks are not placed in receivership, their senior managers are left in place, and the taxpayers secretly subsidize their risk capital. This policy is indefensible. It is also unlawful. It violates the Prompt Corrective Action law. If it is continued it will cause future crises and recurrent scandals.
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Under the current regulatory system banks that are too big to fail pose a clear and present danger to the economy. They are not national assets. A bank that is too big to fail is too big to operate safely and too big to regulate. It poses a systemic risk. These banks are not “systemically important”, they are “systemically dangerous.” They are ticking time bombs – except that many of them have already exploded.
Mr. Black then listed twenty areas of reform where these institutions would face additional regulatory compliance and restrictions on their activities, including a ban on “all new speculative investments”. Paul Volcker took that issue a step further with his criticism of “proprietary trading” by these institutions, which often can result in conflicts of interest with customers, since these banks are trading on their own accounts while in a position to act on the confidential investing strategies of their clients.
Paul Volcker made a point of emphasizing the need to clarify the overlapping jurisdictions of the Securities and Exchange Commission and the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC). On September 18, David Corn wrote a piece about the CFTC, describing it as:
… a somewhat obscure federal agency, but an important one. Its mission is to protect consumers and investors by preventing misconduct in futures trading that could distort the prices of agricultural and energy commodities. In 2000, the CFTC wanted to regulate credit default swaps — complicated and privately traded financial instruments that helped grease the way to the subprime meltdown — but Republican Sen. Phil Gramm, then the chair of the Senate Banking Committee, Fed chair Alan Greenspan and Clinton administration officials (including Lawrence Summers, now President Obama’s top economic adviser) blocked that effort. Had the CFTC been allowed to police swaps, the housing finance crisis that begot the economic crash of last year might not have been as bad. So the CFTC is a critical agency. And under Obama’s proposal for more robust financial regulation — which he talked about during a Wall Street visit on Monday — the CFTC would have greater responsibility to make sure no one was gaming the financial system. Consequently, the composition of the CFTC is more significant than ever.
Mr. Corn expressed his concern over the fact that the Obama administration had nominated Scott O’Malia, a Republican Senate aide, to be a commissioner on the CTFC:
For the past seven years, he’s been a GOP staffer in the Senate. But before that he was a lobbyist for Mirant, an Atlanta-based electricity company. According to House and Senate records, while at Mirant O’Malia was registered to lobby for greater deregulation at a time when his company was exploiting the then-ongoing deregulation of the energy market to bilk consumers. Remember the Enron-driven electricity crisis in California of 2001, when Enron and other companies were manipulating the state’s deregulated electricity markets, causing prices to go sky-high, creating rolling black-outs and triggering a statewide emergency? Mirant was one of those other companies. According to state investigators, Mirant deliberately held back power to force prices up.
After the crisis, Mirant was investigated by various federal and local agencies and became the target of a number of lawsuits. It ultimately agreed to pay California about half a billion dollars to settle claims it had screwed the state’s residents. It also was fined $12.5 million — by the CFTC! — for attempting to manipulate natural gas prices.
Mr. O’Malia had previously been nominated for this position by President George W. Bush. Nevertheless, Washington Senator Maria Cantwell helped block the nomination. As a result, David Corn was understandably shocked when O’Malia was re-nominated for this same position by the Obama administration:
Yet Obama has brought it back. Why would a president who craves change in Washington and who wants the CFTC to be a tougher watchdog do that?
The answer to that question is another question: Does President Obama really want the CFTC to be a tougher watchdog or just another “lap dog” like the SEC?
After all the promises of the needed regulatory “clean-up” to prevent another financial crisis, can we really trust our current leadership to accomplish anything toward that goal?
I guess it’s because I was using TurboTax to work on my income tax return for the past few days, that I was constantly reminded of Treasury Secretary “Turbo” Tim Geithner. Criticism continues to abound concerning the plan by Turbo Tim and Larry Summers for getting the infamous “toxic assets” off the balance sheets of our nation’s banks. It’s known as the Public-Private Investment Program (a/k/a: PPIP or “pee-pip”). I recently read an article by a couple of Economics professors named Laurence J. Kotlikoff (Boston University) and Jeffrey Sachs (Columbia University) wherein they referred to this plan as the GASP (Geithner And Summers Plan). Their bottom line:
The Geithner-and-Summers Plan should be scrapped. President Obama should ask his advisors to canvas the economics and legal community to hear the much better ideas that are in wide circulation.
One of the harshest critics of the PPIP is William Black, an Economics professor at the University of Missouri. Professor Black gained recognition during the 1980s while he was deputy director of the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation (FSLIC). During that time, the FSLIC helped block an attempted sale of Charles Keating’s Lincoln Savings and Loan, which was subsequently seized by the Federal Home Loan Bank Board, despite opposition from five United States Senators, who became known as the Keating Five. A recent interview with Professor Black by Jack Willoughby of Barrons revealed that Black’s aversion to the PPIP starts with the fact that it is being implemented by Geithner and Summers:
We have failed bankers giving advice to failed regulators on how to deal with failed assets. How can it result in anything but failure? If they are going to get any truthful investigation, the Democrats picked the wrong financial team. Tim Geithner, the current Secretary of the Treasury, and Larry Summers, chairman of the National Economic Council, were important architects of the problems. Geithner especially represents a failed regulator, having presided over the bailouts of major New York banks.
I particularly enjoyed Black’s characterization of the PPIP’s use of government (i.e. taxpayer) money to back private purchases of the toxic assets:
It is worse than a lie. Geithner has appropriated the language of his critics and of the forthright to support dishonesty. That is what’s so appalling — numbering himself among those who convey tough medicine when he is really pandering to the interests of a select group of banks who are on a first-name basis with Washington politicians.
The current law mandates prompt corrective action, which means speedy resolution of insolvencies. He is flouting the law, in naked violation, in order to pursue the kind of favoritism that the law was designed to prevent. He has introduced the concept of capital insurance, essentially turning the U.S. taxpayer into the sucker who is going to pay for everything. He chose this path because he knew Congress would never authorize a bailout based on crony capitalism.
For the past month or so, I’ve been hearing many stock market commentators bemoan the fact that there is so much money “on the sidelines”. In other words, people with trading accounts are letting their money sit in brokerage money market accounts, rather than risking it in the stock markets. I believe that many of these people are so discouraged by the sleazy environment on Wall Street, they are waiting for things to get cleaned up before they take any more chances in a casino where so many games are rigged. In the Barrons interview, Black made a point that reinforced my opinion:
His (Geithner’s) use of language like “legacy assets” — and channeling the worst aspects of Milton Friedman — is positively Orwellian. Extreme conservatives wrongly assume that the government can’t do anything right. And they wrongly assume that the market will ultimately lead to correct actions. If cheaters prosper, cheaters will dominate. It is like Gresham’s law: Bad money drives out the good. Well, bad behavior drives out good behavior, without good enforcement.
By asking Professor Black a few simple, straightforward questions (in layperson’s language) Jack Willoughby got some fantastic and refreshing information in return (also in layperson’s language) making this article a “must read”. As Black and many others have pointed out, these huge financial institutions must be broken down into smaller businesses. Why isn’t this being undertaken? Professor Black looks to where the buck stops:
Obama, who is doing so well in so many other arenas, appears to be slipping because he trusts Democrats high in the party structure too much.
These Democrats want to maintain America’s pre-eminence in global financial capitalism at any cost. They remain wedded to the bad idea of bigness, the so-called financial supermarket — one-stop shopping for all customers — that has allowed the American financial system to paper the world with subprime debt. Even the managers of these worldwide financial conglomerates testify that they have become so sprawling as to be unmanageable.
Another critic of the Geithner-Summers PPIP is former Secretary of Labor, Robert Reich. Reich is now a professor at the University of California at Berkeley. His April 6 blog entry discussed the fact that the top 25 hedge fund managers earned a total of $11.6 billion last year:
But what causes me severe heartburn is that these are exactly the sort of investors Tim Geithner is trying to lure in to buy troubled assets from banks, with an extraordinary offer financed by you and me and other taxpayers: If it turns out the troubled assets are worth more than these guys pay for them, they could make a fortune. If it turns out the assets are worth less, these guys won’t lose a thing because we taxpayers will bail them out. Plus, they get to pick only the highest-rated of the big banks’ bad assets and can review them carefully before buying.
What a deal. Why can’t you and I get in on this bonanza? Because we’re too small. The government will designate only about five big investor funds — run or owned by the richest of the rich — as potential buyers. Hedge funds fit the bill perfectly.
It’s nice to know that more and more prominent individuals in the world of economics and public policy are taking the ethical stand against a program based on the principle of “socialized loss and privatized gain”. I just hope President Obama doesn’t take too long to realize that these people are right and that the Geithner – Summers team is wrong.
TheCenterLane.com offers opinion, news and commentary on politics, the economy, finance and other random events that either find their way into the news or are ignored by the news reporting business. As the name suggests, our focus will be on what seems to be happening in The Center Lane of American politics and what the view from the Center reveals about the events in the left and right lanes. Your Host, John T. Burke, Jr., earned his Bachelor of Arts degree from Boston College with a double major in Speech Communications and Philosophy. He earned his law degree (Juris Doctor) from the Illinois Institute of Technology / Chicago-Kent College of Law.
The Outrage Continues
February 1, 2010
The news reports of the past few days have brought us enough fuel to keep us outraged for the next decade. Let’s just hope that some of this lasts long enough for the November elections. I will touch on just three of the latest stories that should get the pitchfork-wielding mobs off their asses and into the streets. Nevertheless, we have to be realistic about these things. With the Super Bowl coming up, it’s going to be tough to pry those butts off the couches.
The first effrontery should not come as too much of a surprise. The Times of London has reported that Goldman Sachs CEO, Lloyd Blankfein (a/k/a Lloyd Bankfiend) is expecting to receive a $100 million bonus this year:
Blankfein is also thumbing his nose at the American taxpayers. Despite widespread media insistence that Goldman Sachs “paid back the government” there is a bit of unfinished business arising from something called Maiden Lane III — for which Goldman should owe us billions.
That matter brings us to our second item: the recently-released Quarterly Report from SIGTARP (the Special Investigator General for TARP — Neil Barofsky). The report is 224 pages long, so I’ll refer you to the handy summary prepared by Michael Shedlock (“Mish”). Mish’s headline drove home the point that there are currently 77 ongoing investigations of fraud, money laundering and insider trading as a result of the TARP bank bailout program. Here are a few more of his points, used as introductions to numerous quoted passages from the SIGTARP report:
My favorite comment from Mish appears near the conclusion of his summary:
Mish’s last remark (and his link to an earlier posting) brings us to the third disgrace to be covered in this piece: The AIG bailout cover-up. On January 29, David Reilly wrote an article for Bloomberg News (and Business Week) concerning last Wednesday’s hearing before the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform. After quoting from Reilly’s article, Mish made this observation:
David Reilly began the Bloomberg/Business Week piece this way:
That “secretive group” is The Federal Reserve of New York, whose president at the time of the AIG bailout was “Turbo” Tim Geithner. David Reilly’s disgust at the hearing’s revelations became apparent from the tone of his article:
The “cover-up” aspect to this caper involved intervention by the New York Fed that included editing AIG’s communications to investors and pressuring the Securities and Exchange Commission to keep secret the details of the bailouts of AIG’s counterparties (Maiden Lane III). The Fed’s opposition to disclosure of such documentation to Congress was the subject of a New York Times opinion piece in December. The recent SIGTARP report emphasized the disingenuous nature of the Fed’s explanation for keeping this information hidden:
The SIGTARP investigation has revealed some activity that most people would never have imagined possible given the enormous amounts of money involved in these bailouts and the degree of oversight (that should have been) in place. The bigger question becomes: Will any criminal charges be brought against those officials who breached the public trust by facilitating this monumental theft of taxpayer dollars?