August 27, 2009
Back on January 5, I wrote a piece entitled: “Clean-Up Time On Wall Street” in which I pondered whether our new President-elect and his administration would really “crack down on the unregulated activities on Wall Street that helped bring about the current economic crisis”. I quoted from a December 15 article by Stephen Labaton of The New York Times, examining the failures of the Securities and Exchange Commission as well as the environment at the SEC that facilitated such breakdowns. Some of the highlights from the Times piece included these points:
. . . H. David Kotz, the commission’s new inspector general, has documented several major botched investigations. He has told lawmakers of one case in which the commission’s enforcement chief improperly tipped off a private lawyer about an insider-trading inquiry.
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There are other difficulties plaguing the agency. A recent report to Congress by Mr. Kotz is a catalog of major and minor problems, including an investigation into accusations that several S.E.C. employees have engaged in illegal insider trading and falsified financial disclosure forms.
I then questioned the wisdom of Barack Obama’s appointment of Mary Schapiro as the new Chair of the Securities and Exchange Commission, quoting from an article by Randall Smith and Kara Scannell of The Wall Street Journal concerning Schapiro’s track record as chair of the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA):
Robert Banks, a director of the Public Investors Arbitration Bar Association, an industry group for plaintiff lawyers . . . said that under Ms. Schapiro, “Finra has not put much of a dent in fraud,” and the entire system needs an overhaul. “The government needs to treat regulation seriously, and for the past eight years we have not had real securities regulation in this country,” Mr. Banks said.
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In 2001 she appointed Mark Madoff, son of disgraced financier Bernard Madoff, to the board of the National Adjudicatory Council, the national committee that reviews initial decisions rendered in Finra disciplinary and membership proceedings.
I also quoted from a two-part op-ed piece for the January 3 New York Times, written by Michael Lewis, author of Liar’s Poker, and David Einhorn. Here’s what they had to say about the SEC:
Created to protect investors from financial predators, the commission has somehow evolved into a mechanism for protecting financial predators with political clout from investors. (The task it has performed most diligently during this crisis has been to question, intimidate and impose rules on short-sellers — the only market players who have a financial incentive to expose fraud and abuse.)
Keeping all of this in mind, let’s have a look at the current lawsuit brought by the SEC against Bank of America, pending before Judge Jed S. Rakoff of The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York. The matter was succinctly described by Louise Story of The New York Times:
The case centers on $3.6 billion bonuses that were paid out by Merrill Lynch late last year, just before that firm was merged with Bank of America. Neither company disclosed the bonuses to shareholders, and the S.E.C. has charged that the companies’ proxy statement about the merger were misleading in their description of the bonuses.
To make a long story short, Bank of America agreed to settle the case for a mere $33 million, despite its insistence that it properly disclosed to its shareholders, the bonuses it authorized for Merrill Lynch & Co employees. The mis-handling of this case by the SEC was best described by Rolfe Winkler of Reuters. The moral outrage over this entire matter was best expressed by Karl Denninger of The Market Ticker. Denninger’s bottom line was this:
It is time for the damn gloves to come off. Our economy cannot recover until the scam street games are stopped, the fraudsters are removed from the executive suites (and if necessary from Washington) and the underlying frauds – particularly including the games played with the so-called “value” of assets on the balance sheets of various firms are all flushed out.
On a similarly disappointing note, there is the not-so-small matter of: “Where did all the TARP money go?” You may have read about Elizabeth Warren and you may have seen her on television, discussing her role as chair of the Congressional Oversight Panel, tasked with scrutinizing the TARP bank bailouts. Neil Barofsky was appointed Special Investigator General of TARP (SIGTARP). Why did all of this become necessary? Let’s take another look back to last January. At that time, a number of Democratic Senators, including: Russ Feingold (Wisconsin), Jeanne Shaheen (New Hampshire), Evan Bayh (Indiana) and Maria Cantwell (Washington) voted to oppose the immediate distribution of the second $350 billion in TARP funds. The vote actually concerned a “resolution of disapproval” to block distribution of the TARP money, so that those voting in favor of the resolution were actually voting against releasing the funds. Barack Obama had threatened to veto this resolution if it passed. The resolution was defeated with 52 votes (contrasted with 42 votes in favor of it). At that time, Obama was engaged in a game of “trust me”, assuring those in doubt that the second $350 billion would not be squandered in the same undocumented manner as the first $350 billion. As Jeremy Pelofsky reported for Reuters on January 15:
To win approval, Obama and his team made extensive promises to Democrats and Republicans that the funds would be used to better address the deepening mortgage foreclosure crisis and that tighter accounting standards would be enforced.
“My pledge is to change the way this plan is implemented and keep faith with the American taxpayer by placing strict conditions on CEO pay and providing more loans to small businesses,” Obama said in a statement, adding there would be more transparency and “more sensible regulations.”
Although it was a nice-sounding pledge, the new President never lived up to it. Worse yet, we now have to rely on Congress, to insist on getting to the bottom of where all the money went. Although Elizabeth Warren was able to pressure “Turbo” Tim Geithner into providing some measure of disclosure, there are still lots of questions that remain unanswered. I’m sure many people, including Turbo Tim, are uncomfortable with the fact that Neil Barofsky is doing “too good” of a job as SIGTARP. This is probably why Congress has now thrown a “human monkey wrench” into the works, with its addition of former SEC commissioner Paul Atkins to the Congressional Oversight Panel. Expressing his disgust over this development, David Reilly wrote a piece for Bloomberg News, entitled: “Wall Street Fox Beds Down in Taxpayer Henhouse”. He discussed the cynical appointment of Atkins with this explanation:
Atkins was named last week to be one of two Republicans on the five-member TARP panel headed by Harvard Law School professor Elizabeth Warren. He replaces former Senator John Sununu, who stepped down in July.
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And while a power-broker within the commission, Atkins was also seen as the sharp tip of the deregulatory spear during George W. Bush’s presidency.
Atkins didn’t waver from his hands-off position, even as the credit crunch intensified. Speaking less than two months before the collapse of Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc., Atkins in one of his last speeches at the SEC warned against calls for a “new regulatory order.”
He added, “We must not immediately jump to the conclusion that failures of firms in the marketplace or the unavailability of credit in the marketplace is caused by market failure, or indeed regulatory failure.”
When I spoke with him yesterday, Atkins hadn’t changed his tune. “If the takeaway by some people is that deregulation is the thing that led to problems in the marketplace, that’s completely wrong,” he said. “The problems happened in the most heavily regulated areas of the financial-services industry.”
Regulated by whom?
The Forgotten Urgency Of Financial Reform
September 10, 2009
With all the fighting over healthcare reform and the many exciting controversies envisioned by its opponents, such as: death panels, state-sponsored abortions and illegal aliens’ coming to America for free breast implants, the formerly-urgent need for financial reform his slipped away from public concern. Alan Blinder recently wrote a piece for The New York Times, lamenting how the subject of financial reform has disappeared from the Congressional radar:
Blinder then discussed five reasons why. My favorite concerned lobbying:
Mr. Blinder expressed concern that these three important changes would be left out of any financial reform legislation: a) resolving the problem of having financial institutions that are “too big to fail”, b) cleaning up the derivatives mess and c) creating a “systemic risk regulator”. (All right — I rearranged the order.)
In case you’re wondering just what the hell a “systemic risk regulator” is, Blinder provided the readers with a link to one of his earlier articles, which said this:
Blinder shares the view, expressed by Treasury Secretary “Turbo” Tim Geithner, that the Federal Reserve should serve as systemic risk regulator, because “there is no other alternative”. Unfortunately, President Obama is also in favor of such an approach. The drawback to empowering the Fed with such additional responsibility was acknowledged by Mr. Blinder:
Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke discussed this issue himself back on March 5, in a speech entitled: “Financial Reform to Address Systemic Risk”. Near the end of this speech, Bernanke discussed the subject objectively, although he concluded with a pitch to get this authority for his own realm:
This rationale leads me to suspect that Mr. Bernanke might be planning to use his super powers as: “liquidity provider of last resort” to money-print away any systemic risks that might arise on his watch in such a capacity. This is reminiscent of how comedian Steve Smith always suggests the use of duct tape to solve just about any problem that might arise in life.
In the September 8 edition of The Wall Street Journal, Peter Wallison wrote an article entitled: “The Fed Can’t Monitor ‘Systemic Risk’”. More important was the subtitle: That’s like asking a thief to police himself. Wallison begins with the point that President Obama’s inclusion of granting such powers to the Fed as the centerpiece of his financial regulatory reform agenda “is a serious error.” Wallison seemed to share my concern about Bernanke’s “duct tape” panacea:
Vesting such authority in the Fed creates an inherent conflict of interest. Mr. Wallison explained this quite well:
When the dust finally settles on the healthcare reform debate, perhaps Congress can approach the subject of financial reform . . . if it’s not too late by that point.