Is it just a coincidence that “Turbo” Tim Geithner was the subject of back-to-back feature stories in The New Yorker and The Atlantic ? A number of commentators don’t think so.
The March 10 issue of The New Yorker ran an article by John Cassidy entitled, “No Credit”. The title is meant to imply that Getithner’s efforts to save America’s financial system are working but he’s not getting any credit for this achievement. From the very outset, this piece was obviously an attempt to reconstruct Geithner’s controversial public image – because he has been widely criticized as a tool of Wall Street.
The article by Jo Becker and Gretchen Morgenson in the April 26, 2009 issue of The New York Times helped clarify the record on Geithner’s loyalty to the big banks at the public’s expense, during his tenure as president of the Federal Reserve of New York. That piece began with a brainstorming session convened by Treasury Secretary Hank Paulson in June of 2008, at which point Paulson asked for suggestions as to what emergency powers the government should have at its disposal to confront the burgeoning financial crisis:
Timothy F. Geithner, who as president of the New York Federal Reserve Bank oversaw many of the nation’s most powerful financial institutions, stunned the group with the audacity of his answer. He proposed asking Congress to give the president broad power to guarantee all the debt in the banking system, according to two participants, including Michele Davis, then an assistant Treasury secretary.
The proposal quickly died amid protests that it was politically untenable because it could put taxpayers on the hook for trillions of dollars.
“People thought, ‘Wow, that’s kind of out there,’” said John C. Dugan, the comptroller of the currency, who heard about the idea afterward. Mr. Geithner says, “I don’t remember a serious discussion on that proposal then.”
But in the 10 months since then, the government has in many ways embraced his blue-sky prescription.
The recent article in The New Yorker defends Geithner’s bank bailouts, with a bit of historical revisionism that conveniently avoids a small matter referred to as Maiden Lane III:
During the past ten months, U.S. banks have raised more than a hundred and forty billion dollars from investors and increased the reserves they hold to cover unforeseen losses. While many small banks are still in peril, their larger brethren, such as Bank of America, Wells Fargo, and Goldman Sachs, are more strongly capitalized than many of their international competitors, and they have repaid virtually all the money they received from taxpayers. Looking ahead, the Treasury Department estimates the ultimate cost of the financial-rescue package at just a hundred and seventeen billion dollars — and much of that related to propping up General Motors and Chrysler.
Edward Harrison of Credit Writedowns dismissed the NewYorker article as “an out and out puff piece” that Geithner himself could have written:
Don’t be fooled; this is a clear plant to help bolster public opinion for a bailout and transfer of wealth, which was both unnecessary and politically damaging.
The article on Geithner, appearing in the April issue of The Atlantic, was described by Mr. Harrison as “fairly even-handed” although worthy of extensive criticism. Nevertheless, after reading the following passage from the first page of the essay, I found it difficult to avoid using the terms “fawning and sycophantic” to describe it:
In the course of many interviews about Geithner, two qualities came up again and again. The first was his extraordinary quickness of mind and talent for elucidating whatever issue was the preoccupying concern of the moment. Second was his athleticism. Unprompted by me, friends and colleagues extolled his skill and grace at windsurfing, tennis, basketball, running, snowboarding, and softball (specifying his prowess at shortstop and in center field, as well as at the plate). He inspires an adolescent awe in male colleagues.
Gawd! Yeech!
The reaction to the New Yorker and Atlantic articles, articulated by Yves Smith of Naked Capitalism, is an absolutely fantastic “must read” piece. Ms. Smith goes beyond the subject of Geithner. Her essay is a tour de force, describing how President Obama sold out the American public in the service of his patrons on Wall Street. The final two paragraphs portray the administration’s antics with a long-overdue measure of pugilism:
But the Obama administration miscalculated badly. First, it bought the financiers’ false promise that massive subsidies to them would kick start the economy. But economists are now estimating that it is likely to take five years to return to pre-crisis levels of unemployment. Obama took his eye off the ball. A Democratic President’s most important responsibility is job creation. It is simply unacceptable to most Americans for Wall Street to be reaping record profits and bonuses while the rest of the country is suffering. Second, it assumed finance was too complicated to hold the attention of most citizens, and so the (non) initiatives under way now would attract comparatively little scrutiny. But as public ire remains high, the press coverage has become almost schizophrenic. Obvious public relations plants, like Ben Bernanke’s designation as Time Magazine’s Man of the Year (precisely when his confirmation is running into unexpected opposition) and stories in the New York Times that incorrectly reported some Goldman executive bonus cosmetics as meaningful concessions have co-existed with reports on the abject failure of Geithner’s mortgage modification program. While mainstream press coverage is still largely flattering, the desperation of the recent PR moves versus the continued public ire and recognition of where the Administration’s priorities truly lie means the fissures are becoming a gaping chasm.
So with Obama’s popularity falling sharply, it should be no surprise that the Administration is resorting to more concerted propaganda efforts. It may have no choice. Having ceded so much ground to the financiers, it has lost control of the battlefield. The banking lobbyists have perfected their tactics for blocking reform over the last two decades. Team Obama naively cast its lot with an industry that is vastly more skilled in the dark art of the manufacture of consent than it is.
Congratulations to Yves Smith for writing a fantastic critique of the Obama administration’s combination of nonfeasance and misfeasance in responding to both the financial and economic crises.
I shouldn’t have been shocked when I read about this. It’s just that it makes no sense at all and it’s actually scary — for a number of reasons. On Wednesday, February 17, Sewell Chan broke the story for The New York Times:
The Senate and the Obama administration are nearing agreement on forming a council of regulators, led by the Treasury secretary, to identify systemic risk to the nation’s financial system, officials said Wednesday.
They’re going to put “Turbo” Tim Geithner in charge of the council that regulates systemic risk in the banking system? Let the pushback begin! The first published reaction to this news (that I saw) came from Tom Lindmark at the iStockAnalyst.com website:
Only the Congress of the United States is capable of this sort of monumental stupidity. It appears as if the responsibility for running a newly formed council of bank regulators is going to be delegated to the Treasury Secretary.
Lindmark’s beef was not based on any personal opinion about the appointment of Tim Geithner himself to such a role. Mr. Lindmark’s opinion simply reflects his disgust at the idea of putting a political appointee at the head of such a committee:
The job of overseeing our financial system is going to be given to an individual whose primary job is implementing the political agenda of his boss — the President of the US.
Regulation of the banks and whatever else gets thrown into the mix is now going to be driven by politicians who have little or no interest in a safe and sound banking system. As we know too well, their primary interest is the perpetuation and enhancement of their own power with no regard for the consequences.
So there you have reason number one: Nothing personal — just bad policy.
I can’t wait to hear the responses from some of my favorite gurus from the world of finance. How about John Hussman — president of the investment advisory firm that manages the Hussman Funds? One day before the story broke concerning our new systemic risk regulator, this statement appeared in the Weekly Market Comment by Dr. Hussman:
If one is alert, it is evident that the Federal Reserve and the U.S. Treasury have disposed of the need for Congressional approval, and have engineered a de facto bailout of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, at public expense.
What better qualification could one have for sitting at the helm of the systemic risk council? Choose one of the guys who bypassed Congressional authority to bail out Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac with the taxpayers’ money! If Geithner is actually appointed to chair this council, you can expect an interesting response from Dr. Hussman.
Jeremy Grantham should have plenty to rant about concerning this nomination. As chairman of GMO, Mr. Grantham is responsible for managing over $107 billion of his clients’ hard-inherited money. Consider what he said about Geithner’s performance as president of the New York Fed during the months leading up to the financial crisis:
Timothy Geithner, in turn, sat in the very engine room of the USS Disaster and helped steer her onto the rocks.
Mr. Grantham should hardly be pleased to hear about our Treasury Secretary’s new role, regulating systemic risk.
The coming days should provide some entertaining diatribes along the lines of: “You’ve got to be kidding!” in response to this news. I’m looking forward to it!
I recently saw the movie Food, Inc. and was struck by the idea that there are some fundamental problems that span just about every situation where government corruption and ineptitude have facilitated an industry’s efforts to crush the interests of consumers. At approximately 36 minutes into the film, Michael Pollan explained how government efforts to prevent abuses in the food industry are undermined by the fact that the government always relies on the “quick fix” or “band-aid” approach, rather than a strategy addressed at solving a systemic problem. In other words: government prefers to treat the symptoms rather than the disease.
As I thought about Michael Pollan’s remark, I was immediately reminded of our financial crisis. In that case, the solution was to bail out the “too big to fail” financial institutions. As legislative proposals are introduced to address the systemic problems and prevent a recurrence of what happened in the fall of 2008, the lobbyists have stepped in to sabotage those efforts.
There were two other factors discussed in Food Inc. as presenting roadblocks to effective consumer-protective legislation: the revolving door between the industry and Washington, as well as “regulatory capture” — a situation where government regulators are beholden to those whom they regulate.
We have seen the impact of these two factors in the financial area and they have been well-documented. The “revolving door” was the subject of two recent essays by John Carney at The Business Insider website. Carney discussed “The Banking Blob” as a secret club of Senate staffers and Wall Street lobbyists:
Staffers on the powerful Senate banking committee are part of what is known as “The Banking Blob,” a person familiar with the matter told us. The Banking Blob is made up of current banking committee staffers and former staffers who are now bankers or lobbyists. They frequently socialize together, often organizing happy hours and parties.
“They move in a pack. They socialize together,” the person says. “Hell. They even inter-marry.”
The Blob is made up of both Republican and Democratic staffers. Outsiders tend to think the Blob members view themselves as “cooler” than other Capitol Hill staff members. Often a job on the banking committee leads to a well-paying job for a Wall Street firm or a position at a K-Street lobbyist law firm.
Carney had previously discussed the problem of Senate banking committee staffers who see their job as simply a stepping stone to a lucrative banking job:
The allure of banking is hardly a mystery. The money is better. Far better than the government wages paid to Capitol Hill staffers. After years of toiling in government service, many staffers dream of a better life in one of the leafy neighborhoods that are so posh you cannot get there on DC’s Metro. . . .
“Everyone talks about people going from Goldman to government. But the problem is the other way. Too many staffers go from Capitol Hill to banking. And even more aspire to make that move. It corrupts the process,” the staffer told us.
The third problem — “regulatory capture” — is best epitomized in the person of “Turbo” Tim Geithner. Joshua Rosner recently dissected Turbo Tim’s often-repeated claim that he has always worked in “public service”. Rosner demonstrated that the only sector that has been “serviced” by Geithner was the banking industry:
Secretary Geithner can keep repeating his assertion he has worked in public service his whole life. Never mind that this calls into question his tangible market experience, this claim begs the question: How does he define working in the public service?
Geithner’s last job, as the President of the New York Fed highlights that question.
* * *
The New York Fed is not government-owned. Most people fail to recognize this fact. Simply, the Federal Reserve Board (responsible for monetary policy, with a dual mandate of full employment and price stability) is an independent part of the federal government, while the New York Fed is a shareholder-owned or private corporation. In other words, where the Federal Reserve Board is www.frb.gov, the District Bank is www.newyorkfed.org. Historically, the New York Fed has been among the most profitable shareholder-owned corporations in the world. Yet it keeps the details of its shareholders’ ownership information private. What we do know is that its owners include precisely those institutions it is tasked to regulate and supervise and those it has obviously failed to adequately supervise. Unlike the other District Banks of the Federal Reserve system, which have overseen their banks quite well, the New York Fed’s concentration of the largest banks, coupled with its unique role of managing the market operations of the entire Fed system, has built a culture where it sees itself as a market participant and peer to those firms it regulates.
The President of the NY Fed is chosen by, paid by and reports to the private shareholders of that private institution. Only three of the nine Directors of the Board of the New York Fed are chosen by the Federal Reserve Board and, until this year, the NY Fed’s Chair — chosen by the Federal Reserve Board in Washington — was a former Chairman of Goldman Sachs who still sits on Goldman’s Board.
* * *
In truth, Geithner’s ineffectiveness in his role as NY Fed President and his current political posturing — without any policy substance to directly address too-big-to-fail or the Fed’s flawed powers to bailout firms — seems to have resulted from design rather than accident.
* * *
If being a public servant is funneling unreasonable amounts of taxpayer capital, without market discipline, to the largest and most poorly managed banks, then Geithner’s selection as Secretary of Treasury makes sense.
One important lesson to be learned from our government’s inability to do its job regulating the financial sector, is that this failure is primarily caused by three problems:
An unwillingness to address a systemic problem by choosing, instead, to focus on “quick fixes”;
A revolving door between government and industry;
Regulatory capture.
Legislators, consumer advocates and commentators should focus on these three problem areas when addressing any situation where our government proves itself ineffective in preventing abuses by a particular industry.
The news reports of the past few days have brought us enough fuel to keep us outraged for the next decade. Let’s just hope that some of this lasts long enough for the November elections. I will touch on just three of the latest stories that should get the pitchfork-wielding mobs off their asses and into the streets. Nevertheless, we have to be realistic about these things. With the Super Bowl coming up, it’s going to be tough to pry those butts off the couches.
The first effrontery should not come as too much of a surprise. The Times of London has reported that Goldman Sachs CEO, Lloyd Blankfein (a/k/a Lloyd Bankfiend) is expecting to receive a $100 million bonus this year:
Bankers in Davos for the World Economic Forum (WEF) told The Times yesterday they understood that Lloyd Blankfein and other top Goldman bankers outside Britain were set to receive some of the bank’s biggest-ever payouts. “This is Lloyd thumbing his nose at Obama,” said a banker at one of Goldman’s rivals.
Blankfein is also thumbing his nose at the American taxpayers. Despite widespread media insistence that Goldman Sachs “paid back the government” there is a bit of unfinished business arising from something called Maiden Lane III — for which Goldman should owe us billions.
That matter brings us to our second item: the recently-released Quarterly Report from SIGTARP (the Special Investigator General for TARP — Neil Barofsky). The report is 224 pages long, so I’ll refer you to the handy summary prepared by Michael Shedlock (“Mish”). Mish’s headline drove home the point that there are currently 77 ongoing investigations of fraud, money laundering and insider trading as a result of the TARP bank bailout program. Here are a few more of his points, used as introductions to numerous quoted passages from the SIGTARP report:
The Report Blasts Geithner and the NY Fed. I seriously doubt Geithner survives this but the sad thing is Geithner will not end up in prison where he belongs.
* * *
Please consider a prime conflict of interest example in regards to PPIP, the Public-Private-Investment-Plan, specifically designed to allow banks to dump their worst assets onto the public (taxpayers) shielding banks from the risk.
* * *
Note the refutation of the preposterous claims that taxpayers will be made whole.
* * *
TARP Tutorial: How Taxpayers Lose Money When Banks Fail
My favorite comment from Mish appears near the conclusion of his summary:
Clearly TARP was a complete failure, that is assuming the goals of TARP were as stated.
My belief is the benefits of TARP and the entire alphabet soup of lending facilities was not as stated by Bernanke and Geithner, but rather to shift as much responsibility as quickly as possible on to the backs of taxpayers while trumping up nonsensical benefits of doing so. This was done to bail out the banks at any and all cost to the taxpayers.
Was this a huge conspiracy by the Fed and Treasury to benefit the banks at taxpayer expense? Of course it was, and the conspiracy is unraveling as documented in this report and as documented in AIG Coverup Conspiracy Unravels.
Mish’s last remark (and his link to an earlier posting) brings us to the third disgrace to be covered in this piece: The AIG bailout cover-up. On January 29, David Reilly wrote an article for Bloomberg News (and Business Week) concerning last Wednesday’s hearing before the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform. After quoting from Reilly’s article, Mish made this observation:
Most know I am not a big believer in conspiracies. I regularly dismiss them. However, this one was clear from the beginning and like all massive conspiracies, it is now in the light of day.
The idea of secret banking cabals that control the country and global economy are a given among conspiracy theorists who stockpile ammo, bottled water and peanut butter. After this week’s congressional hearing into the bailout of American International Group Inc., you have to wonder if those folks are crazy after all.
Wednesday’s hearing described a secretive group deploying billions of dollars to favored banks, operating with little oversight by the public or elected officials.
That “secretive group” is The Federal Reserve of New York, whose president at the time of the AIG bailout was “Turbo” Tim Geithner. David Reilly’s disgust at the hearing’s revelations became apparent from the tone of his article:
By pursuing this line of inquiry, the hearing revealed some of the inner workings of the New York Fed and the outsized role it plays in banking. This insight is especially valuable given that the New York Fed is a quasi-governmental institution that isn’t subject to citizen intrusions such as freedom of information requests, unlike the Federal Reserve.
This impenetrability comes in handy since the bank is the preferred vehicle for many of the Fed’s bailout programs. It’s as though the New York Fed was a black-ops outfit for the nation’s central bank.
* * *
The New York Fed is one of 12 Federal Reserve Banks that operate under the supervision of the Federal Reserve’s board of governors, chaired by Ben Bernanke. Member-bank presidents are appointed by nine-member boards, who themselves are appointed largely by other bankers.
As Representative Marcy Kaptur told Geithner at the hearing: “A lot of people think that the president of the New York Fed works for the U.S. government. But in fact you work for the private banks that elected you.”
The “cover-up” aspect to this caper involved intervention by the New York Fed that included editing AIG’s communications to investors and pressuring the Securities and Exchange Commission to keep secret the details of the bailouts of AIG’s counterparties (Maiden Lane III). The Fed’s opposition to disclosure of such documentation to Congress was the subject of a New York Timesopinion piece in December. The recent SIGTARP report emphasized the disingenuous nature of the Fed’s explanation for keeping this information hidden:
SIGTARP’s audit also noted that the now familiar argument from Government officials about the dire consequences of basic transparency, as advocated by the Federal Reserve in connection with Maiden Lane III, once again simply does not withstand scrutiny. Federal Reserve officials initially refused to disclose the identities of the counterparties or the details of the payments, warning that disclosure of the names would undermine AIG’s stability, the privacy and business interests of the counterparties, and the stability of the markets. After public and Congressional pressure, AIG disclosed the identities of its counterparties, including its eight largest: Societe Generale, Goldman Sachs Group Inc., Merrill Lynch, Deutsche Bank AG, UBS, Calyon Corporate and Investment Banking (a subsidiary of Credit Agricole S.A.), Barclays PLC, and Bank of America.
Notwithstanding the Federal Reserve’s warnings, the sky did not fall; there is no indication that AIG’s disclosure undermined the stability of AIG or the market or damaged legitimate interests of the counterparties.
The SIGTARP investigation has revealed some activity that most people would never have imagined possible given the enormous amounts of money involved in these bailouts and the degree of oversight (that should have been) in place. The bigger question becomes: Will any criminal charges be brought against those officials who breached the public trust by facilitating this monumental theft of taxpayer dollars?
TheCenterLane.com offers opinion, news and commentary on politics, the economy, finance and other random events that either find their way into the news or are ignored by the news reporting business. As the name suggests, our focus will be on what seems to be happening in The Center Lane of American politics and what the view from the Center reveals about the events in the left and right lanes. Your Host, John T. Burke, Jr., earned his Bachelor of Arts degree from Boston College with a double major in Speech Communications and Philosophy. He earned his law degree (Juris Doctor) from the Illinois Institute of Technology / Chicago-Kent College of Law.
Inviting Blowback
March 11, 2010
Is it just a coincidence that “Turbo” Tim Geithner was the subject of back-to-back feature stories in The New Yorker and The Atlantic ? A number of commentators don’t think so.
The March 10 issue of The New Yorker ran an article by John Cassidy entitled, “No Credit”. The title is meant to imply that Getithner’s efforts to save America’s financial system are working but he’s not getting any credit for this achievement. From the very outset, this piece was obviously an attempt to reconstruct Geithner’s controversial public image – because he has been widely criticized as a tool of Wall Street.
The article by Jo Becker and Gretchen Morgenson in the April 26, 2009 issue of The New York Times helped clarify the record on Geithner’s loyalty to the big banks at the public’s expense, during his tenure as president of the Federal Reserve of New York. That piece began with a brainstorming session convened by Treasury Secretary Hank Paulson in June of 2008, at which point Paulson asked for suggestions as to what emergency powers the government should have at its disposal to confront the burgeoning financial crisis:
The recent article in The New Yorker defends Geithner’s bank bailouts, with a bit of historical revisionism that conveniently avoids a small matter referred to as Maiden Lane III:
Edward Harrison of Credit Writedowns dismissed the NewYorker article as “an out and out puff piece” that Geithner himself could have written:
The article on Geithner, appearing in the April issue of The Atlantic, was described by Mr. Harrison as “fairly even-handed” although worthy of extensive criticism. Nevertheless, after reading the following passage from the first page of the essay, I found it difficult to avoid using the terms “fawning and sycophantic” to describe it:
Gawd! Yeech!
The reaction to the New Yorker and Atlantic articles, articulated by Yves Smith of Naked Capitalism, is an absolutely fantastic “must read” piece. Ms. Smith goes beyond the subject of Geithner. Her essay is a tour de force, describing how President Obama sold out the American public in the service of his patrons on Wall Street. The final two paragraphs portray the administration’s antics with a long-overdue measure of pugilism:
Congratulations to Yves Smith for writing a fantastic critique of the Obama administration’s combination of nonfeasance and misfeasance in responding to both the financial and economic crises.