The Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission (FCIC) was created by section 5 of the Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act (or FERA) which was signed into law on May 20, 2009. The ten-member Commission has been modeled after the Pecora Commission of the early 1930s, which investigated the causes of the Great Depression, and ultimately provided a basis for reforms of Wall Street and the banking industry. As I pointed out on April 15, more than a few commentators had been expressing their disappointment with the FCIC. Section (5)(h)(1) of the FERA established a deadline for the FCIC to submit its report:
On December 15, 2010, the Commission shall submit to the President and to the Congress a report containing the findings and conclusions of the Commission on the causes of the current financial and economic crisis in the United States.
In light of the fact that it took the FCIC eight months to conduct its first hearing, one shouldn’t be too surprised to learn that their report had not been completed by December 15. The FCIC expects to have the report finalized in approximately one month. This article by Phil Mattingly and Robert Schmidt of Bloomberg News provides a good history of the partisan struggle within the FCIC. On December 14, Sewell Chan of The New York Times disclosed that the four Republican members of the FCIC would issue their own report on December 15:
The Republican members of the panel were angered last week when the commission voted 6 to 4, along partisan lines, to limit individual comments by the commissioners to 9 pages each in a 500-page report that the commission plans to publish next month with Public Affairs, an imprint of the Perseus Books Group, one Republican commissioner said.
Beyond that, Shahien Nasiripour of the Huffington Post revealed more details concerning the dissent voiced by Republican panel members:
During a private commission meeting last week, all four Republicans voted in favor of banning the phrases “Wall Street” and “shadow banking” and the words “interconnection” and “deregulation” from the panel’s final report, according to a person familiar with the matter and confirmed by Brooksley E. Born, one of the six commissioners who voted against the proposal.
I gave those four Republican members more credit than that. I was wrong. Commission Vice-Chairman Bill Thomas, along with Douglas Holtz-Eakin, Peter Wallison, and Keith Hennessey issued their own propaganda piece as a preemptive strike against whatever less-than-complimentary things the FCIC might ultimately say about the Wall Street Plutocrats. The spin strategy employed by these men in explaining the cause of the financial crisis is to blame Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac for the entire episode. (That specious claim has been debunked by Mark Thoma and others many times.) This remark from the “Introduction” section of the Republicans’ piece set the tone:
While the housing bubble, the financial crisis, and the recession are surely interrelated events, we do not believe that the housing bubble was a sufficient condition for the financial crisis. The unprecedented number of subprime and other weak mortgages in this bubble set it and its effect apart from others in the past.
Many economists and other commentators will have plenty of fun ripping this thing to shreds. One of the biggest lies that jumped right out at me was this statement from page 5 of the so-called Financial Crisis Primer:
Put simply, the risk of a housing collapse was simply not appreciated. Not by homeowners, not by investors, not by banks, not by rating agencies, and not by regulators.
That lie can and will be easily refuted — many times over — by the simple fact that a large number of essays had been published by economists, commentators and even dilettantes who predicted the housing collapse.
Yves Smith provided a refreshing retort to the Plutocracy’s Primer at her Naked Capitalism website:
This whole line of thinking is garbage, the financial policy equivalent of arguing that the sun revolves around the earth. Yes, the US and other countries provide overly generous subsidies to housing, and curtailing them over time would not be a bad idea. But that’s been our policy for decades. Calling that a major, let alone primary, cause of the crisis, is simply a highly coded “blame the poor” strategy. In reality, both the run-up to the crisis and its aftermath were one of the greatest wealth transfers from the citizenry at large to a comparatively small group of rentiers in the history of man.
* * *
This pathetic development shows how deeply this country is in thrall to lobbyists. But these so-called commissioners, who are really no more than financial services minions out to misbrand themselves as independent, look to have overplayed their hand. This stunt shows more than a tad of desperation on the part of banks and their operatives in their excessive efforts block any remotely accurate, and therefore critical, report on the industry.
Perversely, this development may be a positive indicator on several fronts. First, the FCIC report may be tougher and more probing than I dared hope.
The fact that a pre-emptive strike by the Plutocratic “Gang of Four” has been initiated with the release of their Primer could indeed suggest that that their patrons are worried about the ultimate conclusions to be published by the FCIC next month. The release of this Primer will surely draw plenty of criticism and attract more attention to the FCIC’s final report. Nevertheless, will the resulting firestorm motivate the public to finally demand some serious action beyond the lame “financial reform” fiasco? Adam Garfinkle’s recent essay in The American Interest suggests that such hope could be misplaced:
Obsessed with vacuous celebrity, Americans make it easier than ever for plutocrats to sail under the radar. Corporate heavyweights and bankers may be suborning Congress and ripping off “we the people” left and right, but we’re too busy dancing with the stars to notice.
Will this situation ever change?
Some Quick Takes On The Financial Crisis Inquiry Report
The official Financial Crisis Inquiry Report by the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission (FCIC) has become the subject of many turgid commentaries since its January 27 release date. The Report itself is 633 pages long. Nevertheless, if you hope to avoid all that reading by relying on reviews of the document, you could easily end up reading 633 pages of commentary about it. By that point, you might be left with enough questions or curiosity to give up and actually read the whole, damned thing. (Here it is.) If you are content with reading the 14 pages of the Commission’s Conclusions, you can find those here. What follows is my favorite passage from that section:
In order to help save you some time and trouble, I will provide you with a brief roadmap to some of the commentary that is readily available:
Gretchen Morgenson of The New York Times introduced her own 1,257-word discourse in this way:
(I find it disturbing that Ms. Morgenson is still fixated on “mortgage mania” as a cause of the crisis after having been upbraided by Barry Ritholtz – twice – for “pushing the Fannie-Freddie CRA meme”.)
At her Naked Capitalism blog, Yves Smith focused more intently on what the FCIC Report didn’t say, as opposed to what it actually said:
At his Calculated Risk blog, Bill McBride corroborated one of the Report’s Conclusions, by recounting his own experience. After quoting some of the language supporting the point that the crisis could have been avoided if the warning signs had not been ignored, due to the “pervasive permissiveness” at the Federal Reserve, McBride recalled a specific example:
William Black wrote an essay criticizing the dissenters themselves – based on their experience in developing the climate of financial deregulation that facilitated the crisis:
At this point, the important question is whether the efforts of the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission will result in any changes that could help us avoid another disaster. I’m not feeling too hopeful.