January 11, 2010
In my last posting, I discussed the need for a 9/11-type of commission to investigate and provide an accounting of the Federal Reserve’s role in causing the financial crisis. A more broad-based inquiry into the causes of the financial crisis is being conducted by the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, led by former California State Treasurer, Phil Angelides. The Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission (FCIC) was created by section 5 of the Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act (or FERA) which was signed into law on May 20, 2009. The ten-member Commission has been modeled after the Pecora Commission of the early 1930s, which investigated the causes of the Great Depression, and ultimately provided a basis for reforms of Wall Street and the banking industry. Like the Pecora Commission, the FCIC has subpoena power.
On Wednesday, January 13, the FCIC will hold its first public hearing which will include testimony from some interesting witnesses. The witnesses will appear in panels, with three panels being heard on Wednesday and two more panels appearing on Thursday. The witness list and schedule appear at The Huffington Post website. Wednesday’s first panel is comprised of the following financial institution CEOs: Lloyd Blankfein of Goldman Sachs (who unknowingly appeared as Dr. Evil on several humorous, internet-based Christmas cards), Jamie Dimon (a/k/a “The Dimon Dog”) of JP Morgan Chase, John Mack of Morgan Stanley and Brian Moynihan of Bank of America. Curiously, Vikram Pandit of Citigroup was not invited.
Frank Rich of The New York Times spoke highly of FCIC chairman Phil Angelides in his most recent column. Nevertheless, as Mr. Rich pointed out, given the fact that the banking lobby has so much influence over both political parties, there is a serious question as to whether the FCIC will have as much impact on banking reform as did the Pecora Commission:
Though bad history shows every sign of repeating itself on Wall Street, it will take a near-miracle for Angelides to repeat Pecora’s triumph. Our zoo of financial skullduggery is far more complex, with many more moving pieces, than that of the 1920s. The new inquiry does have subpoena power, but its entire budget, a mere $8 million, doesn’t even match the lobbying expenditures for just three banks (Citi, Morgan Stanley, Bank of America) in the first nine months of 2009. The firms under scrutiny can pay for as many lawyers as they need to stall between now and Dec. 15, deadline day for the commission’s report.
More daunting still is the inquiry’s duty to reach into high places in the public sector as well as the private. The mystery of exactly what happened as TARP fell into place in the fateful fall of 2008 thickens by the day — especially the behind-closed-door machinations surrounding the government rescue of A.I.G. and its counterparties.
A similar degree of skepticism was apparent in a recent article by Binyamin Appelbaum of The Washington Post. Mr. Appelbaum also made note of the fact that the relatively small, $8 million budget — for an investigation that has until December 15 to prepare its report — will likely be much less than the amount spent by the banks under investigation. Appelbaum pointed out that FCIC vice chairman, William Thomas, a retired Republican congressman from California, felt that the commission would benefit from its instructions to focus on understanding the crisis rather than providing policy recommendations. Nevertheless, both Angelides and Thomas expressed concern about the December 15 deadline:
The tight timetable also makes it impossible to produce a comprehensive account of the crisis, both men said. Instead, the commission will focus its work on particular topics, perhaps producing a series of case studies, Angelides said.
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Both Angelides and Thomas acknowledged that the commission is off to a slow start, having waited more than a year since the peak of the crisis to hold its first hearing. Thomas said that a lot of work already was happening behind the scenes and that the hearing next week could be compared to a rocket lifting off after a lengthy construction process.
Even as books and speeches about the crisis pile up, Thomas expressed confidence that the committee’s work could still make a difference.
“There are a lot of people who still haven’t learned the lessons,” he said.
One of those people who still has not learned his lesson is Treasury Secretary “Turbo” Tim Geithner, who is currently facing a chorus of calls for his resignation or firing. Economist Randall Wray, in a piece entitled, “Fire Geithner Now!” shared my sentiment that Turbo Tim is not the only one who needs to go:
There is a growing consensus that it is time for President Obama to fire Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner. While he is at it, he needs to clean house by firing Larry Summers, by banning Robert Rubin from Washington, and by appointing a replacement for Chairman Bernanke. It is time for a fresh start.
Geithner is facing renewed scrutiny due to his questionable actions while at the NYFed. As reported on Bloomberg and in the NYT, secret emails show that the NYFed under Geithner’s command prohibited AIG from reporting that it was passing government bail-out funds directly to counterparties, including Goldman Sachs.
Beyond that, Professor Wray emphasized that Obama’s new economic team should be able to recognize the following four principles (which I have abbreviated):
1. Banks do not face a liquidity crisis, rather they are massively insolvent. Reported profits are due entirely to trading activities – which amount to nothing more than a game of Old Maid, with institutions selling bad assets to each other at inflated prices on a quid-pro-quo basis. As such, they need to be shut down and resolved. …
2. Saving financial institutions does not save the economy. …
3. As such, all of the bail-outs and guarantees provided to financial institutions (over $20 trillion) need to be unwound. Not because we cannot “afford” them but because they are dangerous. Unfortunately, Congress has come to see all of these trillions of dollars committed to Wall Street as a barrier to spending more on Main street. …
4. Finally, we need an economic team that understands government finance. The current team is hopelessly confused, led and misguided by Robert Rubin. …
At The Business Insider website, Henry Blodget gave a four-minute, video presentation, citing five reasons why Geithner should resign. The text version of this discussion appears at The Huffington Post. Nevertheless, at The Business Insider’s Clusterstock blog, John Carney expressed his belief that Geithner would not quit or be forced to leave office until after the mid-term elections in November:
We would like to see Geithner go now.
* * *
But there’s little chance this will happen. The Obama administration cannot afford to show weakness. If it caved to Congressional critics of Geithner, lawmakers would be further emboldened to chip away at the president’s authority. Senate Republicans would likely turn the confirmation hearing of Geithner’s replacement into a brawl — one that would not reflect well on the White House or Democrat Congressional leadership.
There’s also little political upside to getting rid of Geithner now. It will not save Congressional Democrats any seats in the mid-term election. Obama’s popularity ratings won’t rise. None of the administration’s priorities will be furthered by firing Geithner.
All of this changes following the midterm elections, when Democrats will likely lose seats in Congress. At that point, the administration will be looking for a fall guy. Geithner will make an attractive fall guy.
Although there may not be much hope that the hard work of the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission will result in any significant financial reform legislation, at least we can look forward to the resignations of Turbo Tim and Larry Summers before the commission’s report is due on December 15.
Financial Crisis Inquiry Disappointment
April 15, 2010
The Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission (FCIC) has been widely criticized for its lame efforts at investigating the causes of the financial crisis. As I pointed out on January 11, a number of commentators had been expressing doubt concerning what the FCIC could accomplish before the commission held its first hearing. At this point — just three months later — we are already hearing the question of whether it might be “time to pull the plug on the FCIC”. Writing for the Center for Media and Democracy’s PRWatch.org website, Mary Bottari posed that question as the title to her critical piece, documenting the commission’s “lackluster performance”:
The FCIC’s failure to issue any subpoenas became a major point of criticism by Eliot Spitzer, who had this to say in a recent posting for Slate :
As Binyamin Appelbaum pointed out in The Washington Post back on January 8, if a financial reform bill is eventually passed, it will likely be signed into law before the mid-term elections in November – one month before the FCIC is required to publish its findings. As a result, there is a serious question as to whether the commission’s efforts will contribute anything to financial reform legislation. Given the FCIC’s unwillingness to exercise its subpoena power, we are faced with the question of why the commission should even bother wasting its time and the taxpayers’ money on an irrelevant, ineffective exercise.
Although Mary Bottari’s essay discussed the possibility that the FCIC might still “get its act together”, the cynicism expressed by Eliot Spitzer provided a much more realistic assessment of the situation:
Just when it was beginning to appear as though we might actually see some meaningful financial reform find its way into law, we have been reminded that Washington has its own ways – which benefit the American public only by rare coincidence.
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